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In this paper we oﬀer a theory of how social composition of a population may determine
its economic and social performance. The question why some of the world’s countries perform
so much worse than others has alternatively been posed as “Why not Africa?” (Freeman and
Lindauer, 1999) because the majority of the worst performing countries can be found in tropical
Sub Saharan Africa. Geographical location appears to be a self-evident explanatory variable
for poor economic development. Yet, recently a couple of studies have provided evidence for a
predominantly indirect eﬀect of geography on development through the shaping of institutions
during colonial time. At the same time the quality of institutions and in particular measures of
the security of property rights have been identiﬁed as a fundamental explanation of the world
income distribution. As one study concludes, “the quality of institutions trumps everything
else” (Rodrik et al., 2002).1
If property rights are missing or insecure, an economy’s wealth can be treated as a com-
mon pool resource and exploitive behavior can explain underinvestment (in physical capital or
education) and slow, absent, or negative growth. Generally this result has been derived as a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium of the common pool problem that precludes cooperative behavior.
Here, we refer to this solution as exploitive equilibrium. From standard game theory we know
that the toughness of competition (here the degree of resource exploitation) is increasing in the
number of players. In other words, if we imagine a society subdivided in competitive groups as
the players of the game, the exploitive Nash equilibrium suggests that the damage caused by
missing property rights is increasing in the degree of social fractionalization. Empirical work
by Easterly and Levine (1997) on “Africa’s Growth Tragedy” supports this view. They reveal
a strong negative link between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and economic development ac-
cording to which “ethnic diversity alone accounts for about 28 percent of the growth diﬀerential
between the countries of Africa and East Asia”. A follow-up study by Alesina et al. (2003)
conﬁrms these results.
An alternative measure of social diversity has been developed by Esteban and Ray (1994).
They argue that social tension depends on social distance and relative group size and derive
1For geography see e.g. Gallup et al. (1999) and Bloom and Sachs (1998). For institutions see e.g. Mauro (1995),
Keefer and Knack (1997), and Hall and Jones, (1999). For the impact of property rights on investment see e.g.
Svensson (1998), and Johnson et al. (2002). For the indirect eﬀect of location on growth via institutional choice
see Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Rodrik et al. (2002), and Easterly and Levine (2003). For surveys on Africa’s
growth problem see Freeman and Lindauer (1999) and Collier and Gunning (1999).
1an index of social polarization. Assuming equal distance between groups the polarization index
suggests that the potential for conﬂict is highest in a society of two groups of equal size and
subsequently decreasing in the number of social groups. In other words, the incentive for civic
cooperation ﬁrst decreases and then increases with social diversity. This hypothesis is supported
empirically by Keefer and Knack (2002) who ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between ethnic ho-
mogeneity and the security of property rights implying that the risk of expropriation is highest
for intermediate values of ethnic fractionalization. A similar result is found by Zak and Knack
(2001) with respect to trust in economic transactions.2
Interestingly, Easterly and Levine (1997) cannot ﬁnd such a non-linear correlation between
growth and ethnic fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003) perform growth regressions using both
indices and conclude that results are substantially weaker using the polarization index. When
both indices are used together, the fractionalization index typically remains signiﬁcant while the
polarization index is insigniﬁcant.
At ﬁrst sight the above empirical studies may suggest an inconsistency in the argument that
bad economic performance is explained by insecure property rights. To see this more clearly,
consider a society subdivided in symmetric groups. The index of fractionalization (i.e. the
probability to draw randomly from the population two people of diﬀerent social aﬃliation)
assumes its mean value of 0.5 when the society consists of two groups. Further rising group
number increases the index of fractionalization and decreases the index of polarization. Because
most of the conﬂict-ridden and slow growing countries show values of ethnic fractionalization
well above 0.5, the above empirical studies suggest that both, economic growth and the risk of
expropriation, decrease as the number of ethnic groups rises.
In this paper we oﬀer an economic model that explains the observed empirical regularities by
endogenizing property rights.3 We consider a priori insecure property rights in a simple linear
growth model and investigate whether a society is capable to develop social norms (through
trigger strategies) in order to self-enforce the ﬁrst-best solution of secure property rights. In
their calculus whether to respect property rights or not groups have to take into account a short
2Both studies use ethnic homogeneity measured as the percentage of population belonging to a country’s largest
ethnic group. Garcia- Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) present one of the rare studies employing directly an
index of polarization. They report that ethnic polarization has a positive eﬀect on civil wars which cannot be
found for ethnic fractionalization. Theoretical reasoning shows that less unambiguous and possibly non-linear
eﬀects of group size on polarization are possible if social distance and asymmetric group size are taken into
account, see Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999).
3Of course, an ad hoc solution of the apparent puzzle may be that the above reasoning neglects social distance
and group asymmetries. Yet, the present paper maintains the symmetry assumption.
2run gain from defection, a loss of growth during the defection period, and a further loss of growth
during the punishment period when all groups relapse to exploitive strategies. The interplay of
these eﬀects explains a non-linear, inverted u-shaped correlation between social fractionalization
and the incentive to defect, i.e. the insecurity of property rights. However, if property rights turn
out to be unenforceable, economic growth decreases continuously as the number of social groups
rises. Finally, economic growth is independent from social composition whenever a society is
capable to enforce secure property rights.4
The present paper is related to two earlier investigations on social cooperation and economic
growth by Benhabib and Radner (1992) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). These studies
diﬀer from the current one in their assumption about the strategy that groups announce to play
in case of defection. There, it is assumed that groups play a fast consumption strategy according
to which they extract resources at the maximum feasible rate. Here, we assume that groups
play a Markovian Nash strategy after defection. We show that this interior solution constitutes
a credible threat because it turns out as an equilibrium in a world without cooperation. The
main diﬀerence between the papers, however, is the focus of investigation. While Benhabib and
his co-authors explore the eﬀects of initial conditions for societies consisting of two groups we
investigate how social composition is related to conﬂict, cooperation, and economic development.
As a benchmark we use an otherwise identical economy where property rights are secure per
deﬁnition. For that purpose the next section brieﬂy reviews the Ak growth model and determines
the ﬁrst best intertemporal allocation. In Section 3 we discuss the Markovian Nash equilibrium
that occurs when property rights are absent and unenforceable and groups act competitively.
This exploitive solution has been investigated by Lane and Tornell (1996) but with a diﬀerent
focus (on the so called voracity eﬀect). Here we concentrate on the economic eﬀects of social
fractionalization. The fourth section contains the main part of the paper. Groups are allowed to
enforce the ﬁrst best solution of secure property rights. Using a particular solution technique (by
representing the value of consumption throughout the punishment phase as scrap value in a ﬁnite
horizon problem of the potential defector) we are able to prove our propositions analytically.
Some proofs, however, are quite long and are relegated to an Appendix for better readability.
4Fearon and Laitin (1996) emphasize the view that cooperation between (ethnic) groups is the rule rather than
an exception. They provide empirical illustration and theoretical explanation within a social matching game
that informal institutions develop which enable local-level interethnic cooperation. See also Axelrod (1984) for a
theory on the evolution of cooperation. The complementing view that conﬂict rather than peace is the rule has
been investigated in a series of papers based on Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995).
32. The Economy and its Performance under Secure Property Rights
Consider an economy populated by a continuum [0,n] of people. The society is subdivided
in n ≥ 2 homogenous groups. We deﬁne a group as a set of people who cooperate with each
other but not necessarily with members of other groups.5 Each group i = 1,2,...,n consists of
a continuum [0,1] of agents with time preference rate ρ > 0 who maximize intertemporal utility





Using capital k ≥ 0 a single output is produced via a linear production technology. In order
to elaborate the consequences of missing property rights we ﬁrst consider an economy where
property rights are secure by assumption. This is the familiar textbook model of growth of an
economy populated by a continuum [0,n] of identical utility maximizing consumers. Given a non-
expropriable personal endowment of capital kj, average productivity A, and depreciation rate δ,
each consumer j ∈ [0,n] faces an individual budget constraint ˙ kj = Akj − δkj − cj. Following,
for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 4.1), economic development is described as
follows.
If
(2) A − δ > ρ,
then an economy with secure property rights develops along a path of positive constant growth












= A − δ − ρ .
Given secure property rights, growth is independent from any subdivision of society in n groups.
5For theoretical analysis we must not determine how people are allocated to groups. For example, regional
clusters, political opinions, language, ethnicity, or religion could be used as allocation device. Here, the attitude
to cooperate can be thought of as the group deﬁning “boundary” according to Barth (1969).
43. Unenforceable Property Rights: The Exploitive Equilibrium
In this section we consider the economic outcome when property rights are absent or unen-
forceable. Following the literature we describe this phenomenon as a common pool problem
where agents of each group are free to invest in and appropriate from a common stock k which
evolves according to




Given k(0) = k0 ≥ 0 groups maximize utility of their representative member (1) with respect
to (5) using a Markovian Nash-strategy, ci(k). Since all groups share symmetric utility functions
and the same state equation, we conﬁne the analysis to Nash-equilibria in symmetric strategies
ci = c for i = 1,...,n.
Theorem 3.1. An economy without property rights has a Nash-equilibrium given by
(6) ci = c = ρk
for i = 1,...,n.







= A − δ − ρn ,





The proof is delegated to the Appendix. The next two theorems compare with the outcome
under secure property rights and show the eﬀect of social fractionalization on economic perfor-
mance in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a set of feasible parameter speciﬁcations for A,δ,ρ,n which enables
an economy with given secure property rights to grow forever but not an otherwise identical
economy without apriori given property rights. The possibility for stagnation and retrogression
increases in the number of social groups.
5Proof. Conditions (2) and (8) have to hold for positive growth with secure property rights and
without property rights, respectively. Condition (8) can always be violated by a suﬃciently
large n, whereas (2) is independent from n. 
Condition (2) requires that the average net productivity (i.e. the net interest rate) is larger
than the time preference rate for positive growth in a world with secure property rights. Without
secure property rights, net productivity divided by the number of groups has to be larger than
the time preference rate in order to generate growth promoting investment. Substraction of (7)
from (4) provides the following result.
Theorem 3.3. If an economy is capable of long-run growth without property rights then growth
in an otherwise identical economy with secure property rights is higher. The diﬀerence in growth
rates is given by (n − 1)ρ, which is increasing in the number of social groups.
In a world with secure property rights everyone earns the fruits of his investment and the
number of groups is a mere scale variable. Since we have assumed constant returns to scale in
production, growth is independent from group number. Without secure property rights every
investment in the capital stock bears the risk of expropriation, i.e. of not earning the fruits of
an investment. Since c0
i(k) > 0 for all i, everyone knows that if he invests more (and raises k)
his contenders will consume more in the future. This knowledge about possible expropriation
drives down investment and growth. Because people cooperate with group aﬃliates and compete
with members of other groups, the risk of being expropriated rises as people are increasingly
surrounded by competing members of other groups. In conclusion, growth decreases with social
fractionalization.6
6The results generalize with respect to iso-elastic utility functions, c
1−θ/(1 − θ), when θ > 1. This requires that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/θ) is not larger than one, a condition that ﬁnds empirical support,
see e.g. Hall (1988) and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998). This assumption also prevents a voracity eﬀect and a fast
consumption strategy. For θ ≥ 1, utility goes to minus inﬁnity as consumption goes to zero and groups will never
exhaust an economy’s resources in ﬁnite time. Nevertheless, condition (8) can be violated and an economy may
retrogress at a constant rate and disappear eventually.
64. Social Norms and Self-enforceable Property Rights
Because under insecure property rights economic performance is always worse and possibly
disastrous, it looks like as if it is in everybody’s self-interest to obey the law. It is therefore
interesting to investigate whether a society is capable to self-enforce secure property rights.
Formally, this can be achieved through trigger strategies. Groups agree to follow the ﬁrst
best consumption strategy as determined for secure property rights in Section 2 and sustain
their agreement by threatening to punish any defector. A credible threat is to relapse to the
exploitive strategy as determined in Section 3 since we have already shown that it constitutes a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
For defection to be possible at all, there must be a delay between defection and punishment. If
defectors were punished immediately at the time of defection without the possibility of a short-
time gain, there would be no incentive to deviate from cooperation. Since c = (ρ/n)k in ﬁrst
best equilibrium, the short-term gain of deviating from this consumption strategy is increasing
in the number of groups. The long-term loss, however, is also increasing in the number of groups
since we have shown that growth in a non-cooperative equilibrium depends negatively on the
degree of fractionalization. The interplay between these three elements, delay of punishment,
short term gain, and long-term loss, determines whether cooperation and self-enforcing laws are
possible in a society or not.





(ρ/n)k if no player has defected at or before time t − T;
ρk if a defection has occured at or before time t − T.
Hence, groups start cooperating and achieve the overall ﬁrst best consumption strategy as long
as nobody defects. Defection means a violation of the social norm by consuming more (and
investing less) than allowed by secure property rights. In other words, a violation of property
rights occurs. After a delay of T time units following the ﬁrst defection all groups i switch to
exploitive Markovian Nash strategies.
For the following discussion, we denote by ∆Vi(n,T,˜ t) the net value of defection, i.e. the net
utility gain from defection at time ˜ t for group i as compared to the cooperative solution. Group
i has an incentive to defect at time ˜ t if ∆Vi(n,T,˜ t) > 0. Since time enters the game explicity
only via the exponential term in the utility functional, we restrict the analysis without loss of
7generality to ˜ t = 0. Further, since we consider only symmetric solutions the utility diﬀerence is
∆Vi = ∆V for all groups i.
The solution is determined in the following way. We ﬁrst calculate value of consumption in
the punishment phase when all groups consume according to the non-cooperative strategy. This
value can be expressed as a function of the capital stock at time T, the begin of punishment.
It enters as a scrap value a ﬁnite horizon problem of optimal control that determines optimal
consumption during the defection period. After optimal consumption of the defector has been
found, total value during the phases of defection and punishment is calculated and compared
to the ﬁrst best solution. The following theorem (which is proven in the Appendix) shows
that non-cooperation may indeed occur and characterizes its consequences on consumption and
growth.
Theorem 4.1. The net value of defection is




















The set of parameters P = {(n,T) | ∆V (n,T) > 0} for which defection occurs is nonempty.
In the phase of defection, the defecting group optimally consumes
(11) c = ρk,
which yields the growth rate




It is interesting to note that during the defection period the deviating group consumes accord-
ing to the non-cooperative strategy ρk, which would also be the ﬁrst best strategy if it were the
only group existing in the economy. In this phase the remaining (n − 1) groups still cooperate
by consuming (ρ/n)k, which explains the overall growth rate (12).
The next theorem speciﬁes the set of parameters P = {(n,T) | ∆V (n,T) > 0} for which
defection occurs. It is proven in the Appendix.
8Theorem 4.2. Defection occurs iﬀ T > log(2)/ρ. For ﬁxed T > log(2)/ρ the curve ∆V (n,T)
starts at ∆V (1,T) = 0 and increases in n reaching a maximum at n = exp[ρT] − 1. For n
suﬃciently large ∆V (n,T) is negative.
Generally, we observe cooperation independently from the degree of social fractionalization.
Only if the delay of punishment and the time preference rate are suﬃciently large such that
exp[ρT] > 2, we observe conﬂict in polarized societies consisting of a few large groups. The gain
of defection is inverted U-shaped in the number of groups and corresponds with the empirical
ﬁnding of a U-shaped correlation between ethnic homogeneity and security of property rights
(see Introduction).
The nonlinear behavior of ∆V can best be explained using equation (10) and its graphical
representation in Figure 1. The ﬁrst term in braces, ρlog[n], results from the utility gain
during the defection phase. Members of the defecting group consume ρk violating the “right” to
consume (ρ/n)k according to the social norm (9). This positive eﬀect is increasing in n. When
there are more competing groups in a society the appropriable share rises. This eﬀect resembles
the so called business stealing eﬀect in the R&D literature, now stealing taken literally.
The second term represents the loss of growth that would result if growth during the defection
phase applied at all times. Growth in the ﬁrst best economy (gFB) is independent from social
fractionalization. Growth during the defection phase (gD) depends negatively on n: the larger
the degree of social fractionalization the larger is the loss of growth promoting investment when
one defecting group consumes ρk instead of (ρ/n)k. Hence, loss of growth, (gFB − gD) =
(1−1/n)ρ, depends positively on n. If this would be the only negative consequence of defection
we would always observe non-cooperative behavior because log[n] > 1 − 1/n for all n > 1.
The overall loss of growth, however, is larger because after detection at time T all social
groups switch to the exploitive Nash-consumption strategy ρk and the economy grows at rate
gN < gD. The last term in (10) represents this eﬀect. The (undiscounted) loss of growth,
(gD − gN) = (n + 1/n − 2)ρ, depends positively on the number of social groups. Note that
while the ﬁrst two eﬀects, log(n) and (gD − gFB), are concave in n, the loss of growth during
punishment is slightly convex in n. Hence, the punishment eﬀect is always dominating for
suﬃciently large n. This reﬂects the negative impact of social fractionalization: the larger
the number of competing groups the lower an economy’s growth rate and the larger the loss
of value in the punishment phase. The overall consequences of this eﬀect are the heavier the
9earlier defection entails punishment. If punishment follows suﬃciently rapidly, defection would
not occur. In other words, the earlier defection is punished the higher the degree of social
polarization needed for non-cooperative behavior to occur.
Taken together, the incentive to violate property rights ﬁrst increases and then decreases
with increasing social diversity. For small n the short run gain from defection (the business
stealing eﬀect) dominates, reaching a maximum at n2 in Figure 1. Marginal utility, however, is
diminishing. For large n (i.e. small power of a single group) the utiltiy gain is overcompensated
by the negative eﬀect of fractionalization on growth caused by a whole society relapsing to
non-cooperative behavior. The incentive to violate property rights is inverted u-shaped. At the
same time, economic growth decreases continuously in social fractionalization [according to (7)]
whenever property rights turn out to be insecure and is independent from social composition
[according to (4)] whenever secure property can be enforced.



















This paper has oﬀered a theory of how social composition aﬀects property rights and, through
this channel, economic development. We have explained why social fractionalization can be non-
linearly correlated with the risk of expropriation (with a highest incentive to violate property
rights at intermediate values) and at the same time have a continuously negative impact on
economic growth. Nevertheless, the model supports also the “institutions trumps everything
view” in that social fractionalization is only harmful for growth if secure property rights cannot
be enforced.
The use of a simple growth model has allowed us to derive our results analytically. Simplicity
entails, of course, also some limitations. For deviation from cooperative behavior to occur, log-
arithmic utility requires high values for time preference and delay of punishment. For example,
a society of two groups is not capable to enforce property rights if ρ = 0.1 and T ≥ 10 (or
ρ = 0.05 and T ≥ 20). Numerically one can verify that the delay of punishment necessary for
non-cooperative behavior can be reduced substantially using a general iso-elastic utility func-
tion. Yet, the ﬁndings of Section 4 cannot longer be proven analytically. On the other hand,
the results highlights the importance of a suﬃciently long time interval between defection and
punishment. This feature has an interesting interpretation in light of Temple and Johnsson’s
(1998) reconsideration of the Adelman-Morris index of social capability. After decomposing the
index, one single variable turns out to be robust in various growth regressions (as proxy for
civic trust). This is the component based on newspaper circulation and the number of radios
per head. Easterly and Levine (1997) provide a similar result. They calculate that Africa’s
telephone system accounts for a loss of one percent per year in growth. Assuming that a high
provision of mass communication reduces the time needed to detect and publish defection, our
model predicts insecure property rights and slow growth in particular for those countries where
suﬃciently polarized societies suﬀer from low social capability through low initial endowment of
means of mass communication.
We have shown that a model-society divided in symmetric groups is suﬃcient to derive our
results. Social structure of existing societies is, of course, far more complex in various aspects.
Not only are groups of diﬀerent size and power. Sociologists and political scientists also empha-
size that people classify themselves and others along multiple dimensions of group membership.
Heterogeneity of social aﬃliation, cross cutting ties, and conﬂicting group loyalties promote
11lower levels of intergroup conﬂict and decrease group cohesion (see, for example, Coser, 1956,
Le Vine and Campbell, 1972). Finally, importance of a particular group membership may itself
vary over time as, for example, class aﬃliation together with income distribution and ethnic
fractionalization together with the evolution of nations (Anderson, 1983). In this paper we have
proposed a theory of how given social fractionalization aﬀects economic growth through the
enforcement of property rights. In the long run, however, both property rights rights and social
diversity are endogenous. A theory that considers an endogenous evolution of both variables
simultaneously constitutes a promising ﬁeld for future research.
12Appendix
The proof of Theorem 3.1 uses the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.1. If a continuously diﬀerentiable function V (k) can be found that satisﬁes
(A.1) ρV (k) = log[V 0(k)] + V 0(k)

Ak − δk − nV 0(k)−1
subject to the boundary condition
(A.2) lim
t→∞
V (k(t))exp[−ρt] = 0,
where k(t) is the nonnegative solution to ˙ k = Ak − δk − c1 − ... − cn with k(0) = k0 and
(A.3) c(k) = V 0(k)−1,
then it generates a symmetric Markovian Nash-equilibrium with the strategy of each player deﬁned by
(A.3).
Proof. Using the Hamiltonian functions deﬁned by
(A.4) Hi(k,c1,...,cn,λi,t) := log(ci)exp[−ρt] + λi [Ak − δk − c1 − ... − cn]




















for i = 1,...,n, where k(t) ≥ 0 solves ˙ k = Ak − δk − c1 − ... − cn with k(0) = k0.
If there are continuously diﬀerentiable functions S1(k,t),...,Sn(k,t) which satisfy (A.5) and (A.6), then
they generate a Markovian Nash-equilibrium by maximizing the Hamiltonians (A.5) (see for example
Theorem 4.1 in Dockner et al. (2000).
By setting Si(k,t) = Vi(k)exp[−ρt] solving equations (A.5) and (A.6) simpliﬁes to solving the following
system of ordinary diﬀerential equations:












Maximization of the Hamiltonians provides
(A.9) 1/ci = V 0
i (k),
and (A.7) can be rewritten as




For symmetric solutions (A.8) and (5) simplify to
ρV (k) = H(k,V 0(k)−1,...,V 0(k)−1,V 0(k),0),
13and with (A.4) Lemma 1 follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let V (k) be deﬁned as
(A.11) V (k) :=
Z k
k0
u0(c(y))dy + V (k0),




{u(c0) + u0(c0)[Ak0 − δk0 − nc0]}
and u(y) = log(y). Diﬀerentiating (A.1) with respect to k and substituting u0(c) = V 0(k) and u00(c)c0(k) =
V 00(k) provides
c0(k) =
[A − δ − ρ]c(k)
Ak − δk − nc(k) + (n − 1)c(k)
,
solving by method of undetermined coeﬃcients yields (6). From (A.11) follows
V (k) = 1/ρ[log(k) − log(k0)] + V (k0)
and insertion of V (k) into (A.1) using V 0(k0) = u0(k0) yields the initial value V (k0).
For (A.2) follows
lim















[log(k0) + (A − δ − ρn)t]exp[−ρt] = 0 .

Proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof is given in three steps. Step 1 derives (11), Step 2 determines (12) and
∆V , and Step 3 proves the non-emptiness of P.



















exp[−ρ(t − T)]dt + gN
Z ∞
T































k − c, k(0) = k0.
The Hamiltonian follows as
H(k,c,t) = log[c] + λ



























Consider the strategy c(k) = ρk. This implies ˙ k/k = gD and hence λ = 1/(ρk) fulﬁlls (A.13).














and with (A.13) follows










This provides k(T) = k0 exp[gDT].




































The total value of defection follows with (A.14) and (A.15) after some simpliﬁcation as
VD+P = VD + VP (A.16)
=
1
ρ2 {ρlog[ρk0] + gD + (gN − gD)exp[−ρT]}.































Set ∆V := VD+P − VFB. From (A.16) and (A.17) follows
∆V (n,T) =
1




































> 0 for n > 1.
This proves that the set of parameters P = {(n,T) | ∆V (n,T) > 0} is nonempty. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Set x := exp[−ρT] then from (A.19) follows













where n ∈ N and x ∈ [0,1].
It is easy to see that ∆V (1,x) = 0.















which provides the extrema n1 = 1 and n2 = 1/x − 1.

























(x − 1)2 . (A.21)
Case diﬀerentiation:
(1) The inequality n1 > n2 is equivalent to x > 1/2 in which case (A.21) provides that n1 is a Maxi-
mum and n2 a Minimum. This yields ∆V (n,x) ≤ 0 for n ≥ 1 and hence there is no incentive for defection.
(2) n1 = n2 is equivalent to x = 1/2 and also ∆V (n,x) ≤ 0.
(3) n1 < n2 is equivalent to x < 1/2. For ∆V follows
∆V (n2,x) = −2 + 4x + log[1/x − 1] > 0 for x < 1/2.
16Hence we can observe defection for a range of values of n ≥ 1 for x < 1/2, where the latter inequality is
equivalent to T > log2/ρ .
For ﬁxed x > 0 it follows from (A.20) that
lim
n→∞∆V (n,x) < 0,
which implies that for ﬁxed T > log2/ρ the range of values of n for which ∆V > 0 is bounded. 
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